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Medini Chopra Spring 2024 Philosophy of Language Prof. Arindam Chakrabarti
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In this paper, I will evaluate the arguments provided by Margolis and Bannerman on the notion of art and dance as a language respectively when applied to codified dance. Following this, I will give evidence of instances where we can perform an action through codified dance, specifically Kathak, stating examples of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. Through this paper, I attempt to strengthen the case for codified dance being a language by illustrating that it not only has linguistic features for communication but functionality for speech acts as defined by Austin.
Given the minimal requirements for a language, Margolis contends that works of art cannot be a language as it lacks syntactic structure, conventions, vocabulary, and speech acts. On the other hand, Bannerman takes the example of Western theatre dance to argue in favor of dance having a similar structure to language; despite the limitations dance has in expressing meaning as opposed to spoken language. If arguments in favor of codified dance as a language are stronger than those against, then according to J.L. Austinâs speech act theory, it should be possible to distinguish different speech acts performed by codified dance.
Margolis argues against art as a language by comparing its functions to that of everyday language (spoken or written), citing the absence of the minimal requirements needed for it to be deemed a language. Those requirements are as follows:
According to Margolis, works of art have expressive qualities due to their nature of being able to invoke emotions in the audience, and may exhibit an emotion without referring to it. However, works of art do not directly communicate and are not a convention for expressing emotions (Margolis, 181). Due to this, works of art are not linguistic utterances for emotions and do not exhibit isomorphism. One feels emotions as a consequence of what the artist is trying to convey and what we infer based on our past experiences; it is not because art can explicitly symbolize an emotion. Further, Margolis gives an example that if cats have a certain way of expressing irritation, that does not imply that this way is the convention to express irritation.
Bannerman agrees with the limitation of dance in conveying literal messages, even though dance communicates through cultural and intra-dance codes as language does. Expressions in dance have a âlooserâ relationship with meaning compared to that in everyday language, which means that denotations and references to meaning in dance are weak. The scope of what we can directly express is limited, for example, we cannot literally say âI am going to my house nowâ through dance. However, Kathak allows for some literal communication (a constructed relationship between movement and meaning). For example, I can say âThis is my cupâ through mudras (symbolic hand gestures) even though that is not the norm, and it is understandable to those who know Kathak. Bannerman mentions that âaside from the specialist code of various styles of mime and of ordinary gesture, there is little in the way of publicly agreed meaning for dance movementâ (Bannerman, 77), and for Kathak, there is an agreed-upon meaning of the movements. If I perform the gesture for âIâ and âplucking a flowerâ, it is possible to say that there is literal communication.
Nonetheless, communication through movements in Kathak is still a limited representation when paralleled with the literal communication achieved by everyday language. This is where Bannerman may argue that sections of movement are utterances instead of sentences (Bannerman, 71). One understands the full extent of the literal communication by movement only when it is accompanied by, say, a summarizing introduction, the tone of the singer, the topical nature of issues represented, etc. The associative meaning we understand through dance is comparable to the literal meaning we understand in language, but there is no direct mapping from movements to sentences. Therefore, we observe that in codified dance there is a stronger relationship between expressions and meaning than in Western dance or works of art. This is not to say that codified dance is now a language, but that the more codified the gestures become, the more âeveryday language-like functionsâ dance can mimic.
According to Margolis, a language requires a finite and formal grammar and a vocabulary of designatory symbols. In art, there is no vocabulary or grammar, especially because of the generalized scope of what art means. We cannot establish set linguistic units across dance, music, poetry, etc. However, for the example of Kathak, this is fairly straightforward, in that the NÄášyaĹÄstra lays out an exhaustive list of mudras, body movements, gaits, gestures, etc. that form the repository and basic units for Indian classical dances. This grammar is finite and generating because you can make any dance utterance by the use of these symbolic units. Furthermore, Bannerman argues that syntax and semantics are related, where the order of words will change the meaning of the sense, and this is true for codified dance as well. If we say âMarcus played with the ballâ versus âThe ball played with Marcusâ, we see the difference in semantics. In dance as well, if one performs a flower blooming and then the flower dying, versus the flower dying first and then blooming, the interpretations are opposite. One evokes sadness and the other, rebirth. Bannerman highlights how dance is structured like a language - with adherence to a code-based system - and this stands for codified dance as well.
Lastly, Margolis denies the existence of speech acts such as querying and demanding in works of art: we cannot âutterâ an instance of art that performs an act; they are standalone objects. However, if you canât marry someone (or state or promise etc.) through dance, that is simply its limitation. While it doesnât guarantee dance as a language, it definitely does not disprove it as a language. Moreover, it is not sufficient reason to claim that dance does not have speech acts at all. Having clarified that I will now provide examples of speech acts in codified dance.
Austinâs speech act theory claims that with words, one can either state something to describe their reality or perform an action. The locutionary act is the act of saying something, which in the case of Kathak, is the dance itself. If I am uttering in Kathak, I am performing facial expressions, mudras, and movements from the repository provided to me, and I am executing a locutionary act. For example, performing a stylized gait to reach my destination.
Illocutionary acts are trickier to identify. Illocutionary is the act performed in saying something, that the speaker intends to fulfill, such as making a promise or arguing. A common example of the illocutionary act is that of telling a story: the dancer runs to the corner of the stage and makes gestures indicating that she is waiting for her lover, and through these gestures, she is performing the act of storytelling. An objection to this argument could be that all codified dance is storytelling or third-person narrative. However, there are more examples of illocutionary speech acts, such as the invocation of God. A dancer can perform the act of âinvoking Godâ by dancing a Ganesh Vandana (or any Hindu God) in Kathak. The intention to invoke Lord Ganesh is present when the dancer performs this act.
Perlocutionary is the effect felt by the audience, for example, fear, being convincing, excitement, etc. It is the act performed as a result of saying something. Perlocutionary acts in Kathak can be derived from the concept of rasa (aesthetic flavor of a dance that evokes emotion in the audience) which is defined by the NÄášyaĹÄstra. The emotion elicited in the audience from the performance is separate from the dancer's intentions, qualifying the performance as a valid perlocutionary act. To trivially view perlocutionary act in codified dance: any performance is going to illicit a reaction from the audience, for example, the audience feeling âmovedâ. The performer cannot declare that they are moving an audience with their performance; it is purely attributed to what the audience feels.